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NARRATIVES, METAPHORS, AND
NEGOTIATION
JAYNE SEMINARE DOCHERTY*

Walter Fisher suggests using the root metaphor Homo narrans as an
extension of Kenneth Burke's definition of human beings as the "'symbolusing (symbol-making, symbol-misusing) animals."" Thinking of human
beings as storytellers makes great sense for students of negotiation. The
medium of negotiation is language, and primary among the types of language
we hear in negotiation are stories. Mediation has been described as assisted
negotiation, and many mediators are trained to begin by asking the parties in a
conflict to "tell their stories." One of the most powerful frames influencing
negotiation behavior is the "whole story frame"-the way parties answer the
question "What is this conflict about?",2 Yet, as a group, many negotiators
pay very little attention to the nature of narrative and to the nature of human
beings as story tellers.
Closely tied to storytelling is the use of metaphors. "The essence of
metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of
another.",3 Many scholars have argued that human thought processes are
essentially metaphorical; we can only make sense of something by comparing
it to something else.4 Furthermore, metaphors shape our actions and our sense
of right and wrong. A powerful metaphor orders the world in such a way that
we can identify roles that are useful and actions that are prohibited or
unthinkable because they fall outside the metaphor.
To demonstrate the nature and the power of metaphors and stories, let us
take an example from a field unrelated to negotiation. Metaphors are closely
related to stories, and they may become shorthand references to stories that
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are shared by many people. Shared metaphors and their related stories
validate (or stigmatize) particular social actions. For example, at the
beginning of the twentieth century, through a contentious political process,
Gifford Pinchot and his supporters convinced the government to create the
U.S. Forest Service.5 The Forest Service is housed in the Department of
Agriculture, primarily because the metaphor promoted by Pinchot was the
forest is a farm.

The metaphor of the forest as a farm encapsulates a narrative about human
beings as good stewards and farmers of the forest; it privileges careful
management of resources, harvesting timber and other products from the
forest, and nurturing good species, while suppressing weed trees and pests. It
is difficult to stretch this metaphor and narrative to encompass the idea of
designated wilderness areas, places where human beings do not farm. On the
other hand, as farming moved from small family farms to agribusiness,
forestry moved from careful, selective harvesting to clearcutting entire
hillsides and replanting a diverse forest with a single species of tree. The
world was literally reshaped as human beings enacted this particular metaphor
and its related story.
Metaphors become invisible through habitual use and processes that
institutionalize the story behind the metaphor. The forest-is-a-farm metaphor
was new and different in the early twentieth century; it was being offered in
place of the forest-is-a-mine metaphor that had guided logging practices for
the previous hundred years. By the mid-to-late twentieth century, this
metaphor had entered the culture and become normalized. For many people it
was no longer seen as a metaphor at all, the forest was a farm. Or, as one
forester I interviewed said, "If you want cabbage you plant cabbages; if you
want fiber you plant trees." The farm metaphor only became visible again
when it was challenged by environmentalists and others who were unhappy
with Forest Service practices. Now the forest-is-a-farm metaphor is under
attack and is likely to be replaced by the forest-is-an-ecosystem metaphor.
Obviously, metaphors and stories, especially when they are shared by
many people, shape and reshape the social and material worlds in which we
live. They also shape our sense of professional practice. What is a good
forester? She is a good farmer of the forest. But if we adopt and implement a
metaphor and institutionalize it without careful reflection, we may take
actions that do great harm.
Negotiators also start with powerful metaphors, particularly their
5. See Jayne S. Docherty, The Stewardship Metaphor in Forest Resource Management
Conflicts: A Common Language Does Not Guarantee Consensus, in CONFLICT ANALYSIS AND
RESOLUTION: CHALLENGES FOR THE TIMES 191-208 (D. McFarland ed., 1996).
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metaphor of the person. Rather than starting with Homo narrans,much of the
literature on negotiation begins with Homo economous or "rational man"-the
person as a rational, analytical, value-maximizing, pain avoiding calculator of
costs and benefits. The economic paradigm and rational actor model of
human beings both hold the notion that "each individual human being pursues
his or her personal values and self-interest, typically in the context of-and
against others-rationally pursuing their ... personal values" and self
interest. 6 This underlying sense of reality is entrenched in concepts such as
cost-benefit analysis, Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA),
and practices such as distributive bargaining. Connected to this paradigmatic
construction of a human nature and social interaction is the metaphor of
conflict as a game and negotiation as a way to structure the game of conflict
nonviolently.
In negotiation, if we start with a metaphor of human beings as selfcentered, rational actors, we will focus on bargaining, and we will proclaim a
great breakthrough when we progress from assuming that bargaining is
distributive to recognizing that it can also be integrative. Taking our lesson
from forestry, we can see that it is important to subject the underlying
metaphors and narratives behind negotiation practice and theory to careful
scrutiny.
For evidence that shifting our metaphor for human beings influences the
way we think about negotiation, we need only compare the essays on power
written by Docherty and Korobkin in this volume.7 Docherty begins with
human beings as meaning makers, while Korobkin begins with human beings
as value-maximizing, cost-benefit calculators.8 Korobkin acknowledges that
his hypothetical bargainers in the essay on power in this volume probably do
not have perfect information and that few negotiations lack emotion.
Consequently, he concludes:
If both negotiators believe that they have a strong BATNA but that
their counterpart does not, each might try to exercise power while
neither yields. Thus, lawsuits go to trial, labor strikes drag on, and
ethnic warfare continues, even when agreements that would make
6. Tom R. Bums, Two Conceptions of Human Agency: Rational Choice Theory and the Social
Theory ofAction, in AGENCY AND STRUCTURE: REORIENTING SOCIAL THEORY 198 (Piotr Stzompka
ed., 1994).
7. See Jayne Seminare Docherty, Russell Korobkin, & Christopher Honeyman, Three
Conceptions of Power, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 861 (2004).
8. To be fair, Korobkin probably does not hold rigidly to this metaphor when he is thinking
about negotiation. He has written elsewhere about heuristics and decision-making in negotiation.
See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Heuristics & Biases at the Bargaining Table, 87 MARQ. L.
REV. 795 (2004).
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both sides better off are feasible. Alternatively, or in addition, the less
powerful party might resent the sense of coercion or inequity inherent
in the more powerful negotiator's demands and refuse to yield,9 even
knowing that this course of action will cause harm to both sides.
The implication here is that the same reasoning processes are at work in
negotiators involved in lawsuits, labor strikes, and ethnic warfare. Every
negotiator is an "asocial (or trans-social) being oriented to the consequences
of action for self (and only for self) .... [T]hey have no defined social
relationships, shared meanings, or cultural forms." 10 In other words, context
is of little importance. Furthermore, each negotiator has subjectively based
interests; but questions of ethics or of moral sentiments, if they are
acknowledged, are "understood as incorporated into [the] actors' preference
structures."" Korobkin's negotiators are also presumed to operate within a
given situation; they do not "transform conditions"; they neither have nor
exercise creative or destructive capacities to alter the systems in which they
are operating.12

By constrast, in the same essay on power in negotiation, Docherty
describes a divorce negotiation and portrays the husband and wife as socially
constructed agents. They have "acquired or learned social rules, institutions,
relationships, and roles."' 13 Moral sentiments enter into their judgment and
action processes; they "are motivated by-and their judgments and actions
14
biased by-moral and ethical aspects of their relationships with others."
They also have the capacity to be innovative or destructive; the power not
only to play within a set game of bargaining but to actually transform the
game into something different.' 5 In short, they are meaning-making
creatures, 16 and in the process of giving meaning to their world, to themselves,
and to others, they can frame and reframe their conflict situation. 7 They may
choose to act as rational bargaining agents when buying a car and choose to

9. Docherty, Korobkin, & Honeyman, supra note 7, at 871.
10. Bums, supra note 6, at 202 (emphasis omitted).
11. Id. at 203.
12. See id. at 203-04.
13. Id.at 202.
14. Id. at 203.
15. Id. at 204.
16. JEROME S. BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING (1990); MARY E. CLARK, IN SEARCH OF HUMAN
NATURE (2001); JAYNE SEMINARE DOCHERTY, LEARNING LESSONS FROM WACO: WHEN THE
PARTIES BRING THEIR GODS TO THE NEGOTIATION TABLE (2001).

17. See Caton Campbell & Docherty, supra note 2. For evidence that in some negotiations a
failure to account for the meaning making characteristic of negotiators can be deadly, see
DOCHERTY, supra note 16.
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act otherwise when negotiating their divorce; context and relationships matter.
Obviously, it is helpful to understand our own metaphors as theorists,
teachers, and practitioners of negotiation. Reflective practitioners of any craft
(including negotiation) are more effective when they understand how they are
thinking in action. 18 Equally useful is understanding that every negotiatorwe
encounter is also a meaning-making creature, a user of stories and metaphors.
We can train ourselves to hear their metaphors and stories' 9 and to probe them
in order to learn more about how they are framing the conflict and the
negotiation process, and this in turn opens options for refraining both the
conflict and the process we are using to manage it. 20 A highly skilled,
reflective practitioner of negotiation should be able to recognize the way
different contexts and social relationships reshape the negotiation
experience; 2 1 understanding metaphors and stories is one way to develop this
sensitivity.
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